Focusing on Europe, this article aims to disentangle the patterns of cultural clustering and to throw more light on concepts such as 'civilizations' and 'cultural zones.' Cross-cultural 
Introduction
Empirical analyses commonly identify cultural clusters based on religious, linguistic, and geographic similarities, which are evident even within Europe. But can we speak of distinguishable civilizations, whose culture and values originate in centuries-old traditions and how important are socio-economic and ecological factors in explaining the value differences and similarities? Inglehart and Baker (2000) conclude that societies generally change their values when they develop economically, but also identify pronounced differences between cultural zones defined primarily on the historically predominant religion and also on linguistic similarities, geographic area and ideological past. Schwartz (2006) geographically distinguishes between clusters of countries with similar values in Europe, namely Western Europe and Eastern Europe. Seeking to detect cultural clusters empirically, Ronen and Shenkar (2013) find that European countries are grouped around linguistic and geographical regions. In the Clash of Civilizations' thesis, Huntington (1996) also depicts a cultural dividing line in Europe: it goes from north to south, tearing apart countries and regions within them based on religious affiliation and imperial legacies into Western, Slavic-Orthodox and Islamic civilizations. Evidently, none of these classifications of cultural zones are grounded in a consistent set of criteria, and hence they have been criticized as 'arbitrary,' 'vague,' (Haller 2002) and unsystematic (Bonikowski 2010) . Their frequent usage in both empirical research and in political and social debates calls for more research to understand the patterns of cultural clustering. While various studies identify factors that explain why certain cultural traits are emphasized more in some countries than in others, the sources of cultural value similarities have so far not been systematically examined.
The clustering of different nations into cultural zones is unfeasible to be attributed to only one element of these nations' historical backgrounds. These elements typically not only overlap with each other (e.g., most Protestant countries speak Germanic languages) but also with various socio-economic indicators, and with environmental and geographical characteristics, which are also associated with value similarities. Therefore, to better understand the clustering of countries I distinguish between the different elements of the countries' historical backgrounds and compare their independent association on patterns of cultural similarities with those of alternative explanatory factors such as socio-economic development, climate, and geographic proximity. This article also develops a thorough theoretical structure, including an outline of the possible mechanisms linking the various explanatory factors to value (dis)similarities, to aid future empirical testing.
Particular geographic regions of the world have rarely been analyzed separately by crosscultural comparative researchers. The availability of rich data on the vast majority of the European countries offers the opportunity to conduct a more refined analysis by employing Europe-specific explanatory variables. Other studies (e.g., Inglehart and Baker 2000; Schwartz 2006 ) suggest large value diversity despite some common historical legacies inherited from Ancient Greece and Rome and from Christianity. At the same time, value differences in Europe may have significant political implications for the European integration. Values, defined as a deeply-rooted and relatively stable set of believes, referring to desirable societal goals, are important not only because they guide individual and group opinions and behavior; they are also embedded in the institutional arrangements, policies, and norms of societies (Schwartz 2006) . Value consent is considered to be a prerequisite for social integration (Parsons 1952) , therefore, the study of value diversity is crucial for understanding European integration. Considerable value differences between old, new, and prospective member states of the European Union may be regarded as obstacles to their successful integration (Gerhards and Hoelscher 2003; Gerhards 2007) . The emergence of the Russian-led Eurasian Union, which aims to be a geopolitical competitor to the European Union, increases the relevance of studying cultural value diversity and its drivers in Europe. This paper consists of an extensive theoretical part followed by an empirical analysis. I first discuss how each of the explanatory factors is associated with patterns of cultural similarities and differences, operationalized as cumulative index of distances on an extensive set of valuerelated items. One of this paper's major contributions is to summarize the multiple mechanisms, linking those factors to cultural similarities. Their relevance has been assumed, but it has rarely or inconsistently been explicated theoretically. I show that many of these relationships are spurious associations not implying causality. In the empirical analysis, I assess the degree to which variance in cultural distance between nations can be attributed to individual factors or groups of factors. This contributes to the debates between supporters of economic and historical interpretations of current value differences between societies. Methodologically, the paper utilizes dyadic regression, which has rarely been used before in this type of research but offers advantages over conventional linear regression. It enables the inclusion of dyadic variables, which can clarify the associations between pairs of countries in a more refined and precise manner. Lastly, the analysis focuses on Europe and therefore makes use of more comparable and specific factors determining the presence of cultural clusters.
Theoretical framework
In this section I decompose the factors related to counties' historical background, implied by previous research to be a source of cultural clustering, and also consider the importance of the socioeconomic development, drawn from modernization theory, and the geographical and climatic characteristics of the countries. There are multiple mechanisms through which those factors could contribute to the formation of distinct cultural clusters. Some of the mechanisms regard historical background as an underlying factor that lead to differences in cultural values, while others suggest that shared commonalities in terms of countries' language, religion, and history can predispose them to interacting more with each other and thus exchanging cultural norms and becoming more similar. The argument for this indirect effect is derived from the 'homophily' principle (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001) according to which 'similarity breeds connection.' Not only similarities, but historical divisions, such as that between the Eastern and Western Roman Empires, and the communist and democratic blocs during the Cold War determined the level of between-country interactions.
The argument that culture can diffuse across national borders is well known in the literature as Galton's problem (Naroll 1973) , according to which countries as units of analysis are not independent of each other as they are inevitably involved in interacts -this leads to biased results of cross-national analyses (Dobson and Gelade 2012) . Moreover, Bonikowski (2010) argues that cross-national interactions lead to value convergence, independently of the effect of a shared geographical area. The conceivable direct and indirect mechanisms linking each of the cultural heritage factors to value similarities will be discussed in the following subchapters.
Religion
Among the first to propose that religion has an influence on people's values is Max Weber, (1958 [1905 ) who attributes the rise of capitalism to the values originating in Protestantism. Maio et al. (2003) explain that religions are in fact ideologies that 'subsume attitudes and values.' Shared religion may also assume cultural similarities 'through common ecclesial institutions or shared doctrinal principles' (Bonikowski 2010:336) . Additionally, the differences in the European welfare state regimes plausibly originated from the religious organizations (Siegel, Licht and Schwartz 2011) , and they are associate with a wide range of social outcomes that are likely related to cultural values.
An alternative view is that religion does not influence culture per se but merely reinforces existing cultural differences (Hofstede 1991; Minkov 2007) . Hofstede (1991) supports his argument with the fact that all major religions have experienced schisms that supposedly reflect pre-existing cultural divisions. Referring to Europe, Hofstede emphasizes the importance of the Roman Empire's legacies. The Great Schism of 1054, for example, could be traced back to the division of the empire into eastern and western parts in the 3 rd -4 th century AD. The success of the Protestantism, he argues, was possible only in the northern parts of Europe, which were not an integral part of the Roman Empire and thus did not inherit its legacy. Therefore, religion is also a proxy for historical events and processes such as the dominance of the Roman Empire, the division of the empire, the Great Schism, the Reformation. Shared religion also facilitates closer interactions between countries, which additionally results in convergence between countries' cultures. This might occur because followers of the same religious denominations establish interpersonal trust more easily, which creates networks, reduces transaction costs, and thereby facilitates international co-operation (Kang and Fratianni 2006; Lewer and Van den Berg 2007; Lee 2013) .
Language
Language similarities might be related to the formation of a distinctive culture. Both cognitive processes and the ways we conceptualize the world are influenced by the language we speak (Sartori 1984; Ronen and Shenkar 2013) . Certain cultural values become embedded in language structures, thus preserving and reinforcing them among the language's users (Fausey et al. 2010) .
Language also enables the transmission of cultural values (Selmier and Oh 2013) as it determines the possibility for interpersonal communication and cooperation. A summary of previous findings concludes that a common language accounts for as much as a 44 per cent direct increase in bilateral trade (Egger and Lassmann 2012) . Language similarities can also improve international communication (Selmier and Oh 2013) . First, similar languages are easier to acquire, therefore increasing the probability that a larger proportion of the population will speak the language (Hutchinson 2005) . Secondly, similarities in vocabulary and grammatical patterns increase the chance that people will comprehend the language even without acquiring it (Selmier and Oh 2013) .
Moreover, language similarities might influence values through the previously mentioned homophily principle. As language is one of the most important elements of identity (Lohmann 2011) , it is likely that language similarities will contribute to the establishment of closer relationships between individuals and countries.
Language similarities also imply kinship ties. Considering the durability of cultural values (Huntington 1996) , a common origin entails sharing the same values at some historical time point; hence, diverging from this shared past culture would be less salient in these countries. Furthermore, language similarities, understood as kinship ties, indicate genetic bonds, and certain cultural values may be biologically embedded (Minkov 2007) .
Lastly, surveys aim at achieving maximum comparability across countries, however, questionnaires cannot always be translated with the exact same meaning in all languages. Due to the resulting measurement error the effect of sharing the same language may be spuriously inflated to some extent.
Political-institutional traditions
Political-institutional traditions influence people's values by propagating policies and encouraging or enforcing certain norms of behavior (Schwartz and Bardi 1997; Gerhards 2007) . The Cold War split the continent between two competing political ideologies. Communism encompassed most Central and Eastern European countries for nearly fifty years (and longer for others) and might have left a durable mark on those cultures. Presumably the communism, as a far left ideology, promoted values such as egalitarianism and rejected hierarchical structures in societal organization. Democratic ideology, by contrast, offers a very different framework for value formation, as its institutions enable individuals to make free choices; thus, it promotes individualistic values (Welzel, Inglehart, and Klingemann 2003; Welzel 2013 ).
It has been argued, that the communist ideology did not have a profound effect on people's mind-set as it was largely rejected, especially in the Central European countries; instead, it influenced people's values through the economic and social conditions it created (Schwartz and Bardi 1997) . Communist ideology, for example, did not incentivize individual achievement, which blocked values such as mastery (emphasizing achievement and ambition) and individualism (Schwartz and Bardi 1997) . While, ideologically speaking, one of the main aims of communism is to remove the social classes and create an equal society, in reality Eastern European countries were organized in hierarchical structures that legitimized social privileges, thus it impeded egalitarian values. As a totalitarian political system, it encouraged individual obedience to the state and consequently promoted values such as collectivism while hindering autonomy. Minkov (2007) reverses the causality between communism and culture, arguing that authoritarianism was not foreign to Eastern Europe and particularly to the Russian Empire even before 1917. This could explain why communist rule was embraced more easily in some societies in the former Russian Empire and the Balkan states and opposed in the Central European countries (Schwartz and Bardi 1997) , whose culture and identity supposedly differed more significantly from that of pre-Soviet Russia.
Another argument is that certain cultural characteristics diffused from the Soviet Union into other Eastern Bloc countries, independently of the ideological influence of communism. This occurred via the export of material culture such as printed books, movies and architecture but also through the role of the subordinated local communist governments, which were forced to obediently copy the Soviet model in their own countries-a process described as 'Soviet cultural colonialism, ' 'organized cultural domination,' and 'cultural sovietisation' (FatuTutoveanu 2012) . In turn, the Western Bloc countries were exposed to American culture through the US military forces in Europe, tourism, propaganda, and mass media (Dean 1997) . Furthermore, there was a mutual exchange of culture among the members of the respective political blocs. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, for example, facilitated close economic co-operation, while the Warsaw Pact fostered political and military connections. Tourism and migration were limited within the boundaries of the communist world. Similar processes took place in Western Europe, namely the formation of the European Community, which fostered economic co-operation and mobility within its boundaries, as well as NATO, where the Western Allies cooperated in politics and defense.
The European Union
The European Union promotes certain values such as democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and tolerance towards otherness (Dixon 2008) , gender equality, and sexual liberalism (Zapryanova and Surzhko-Harned 2016) . These values, often depicted as 'European values,' are spread through its institutions (Meyer et al. 1997) and in the mass media; they were legislatively reinforced in the early member states, and consenting to them is an acceptance condition for new members. Additionally, the European Union fosters close co-operation between its members by enabling free movement of persons, goods, and services, and by facilitating inter-union mobility, thus lifting institutional barriers to the diffusion of values.
Imperial legacies
Similar to the process of top down and horizontal cultural diffusion in the Soviet Union, other imperial powers have also left their imprint on the values of the populations under their control. Empires establish their institutions and export cultural practices to their subjects (Bonikowski 2010) and also allow increased mobility and interaction within their boundaries. Huntington (1993 Huntington ( , 1996 suggests that a sharp cultural divide exists between the Western European nations, including those under Austro-Hungarian rule and those to the east-the Russian and Ottoman Empires.
Socioeconomic modernization
A central feature of modernization theory is that socioeconomic development drives a profound value and institutional change in societies. The theory originates from Marx (1973 Marx ( [1939 ), who predicts that the developing societies would follow the same path of economic and cultural change that the industrialized societies had gone through (Inglehart and Baker 2000) . Industrialization, as a process of harnessing nature, devalues the divine interpretation of the world, therefore, industrializing societies experience cultural change from traditional to secular/rational values (Inglehart and Baker 2000) . Inglehart and Baker claim that the rise of the service economy results in a second cultural change-from survival to self-expression values. This follows the rise in existential security and the increased importance of the ability to work with other people and express one's opinions in a service-oriented economy. Welzel et al. (2003) have further developed modernization theory by depicting a coherent structure of human development, a central element of which is individual choice. The process originates with socioeconomic development, which provides the individuals with economic, cognitive, and social resources that respectively breed materially, intellectually and socially independent individuals (Inglehart and Welzel 2005) . The satisfaction of these needs creates individuals who are secure in their existence, which gives rise to 'self-expression values that emphasize human emancipation, giving liberty priority over discipline, diversity over conformity, and autonomy over authority ' (pp. 151-152) . Additionally, the level of economic development can be regarded as another source of similarity that may increase interaction between countries at comparable degrees of development. Poorer countries are considered less trustworthy by Western European publics (Gerritsen and Lubbers 2010; Klingemann and Weldon 2013) , thus more co-operation may take place among wealthier countries than between those at different levels of development, which can also impede cultural exchange.
Climate
Previous research suggests that some characteristics of the physical environment may influence the cultural traits of populations (Van de Vliert 2008; Dobson and Gelade 2012) . Moderately low annual temperatures combined with continuous rainfalls are natural endowments that are particularly conducive to the development of certain values through a number of mechanisms (Welzel 2013) . First, these climatic characteristics enabled the establishment of autonomous family farming with conceptually different labor relationships and a less hierarchical societal structure. Economic autonomy and less oppressive relationships between lord and peasants enabled the evolution of autonomous and egalitarian cultural values (Welzel 2013) . Second, such natural endowments offer a considerable advantage in terms of returns to agrarian labor (Gallup and Sachs 2000) , permitting the accumulation of a larger economic surplus and enabling faster technological advancement (Welzel 2013) . Therefore, climate predetermines current disparities in economic development, which are strongly associated with value differences. Additionally, colder temperatures reduce the prevalence and incidence of certain infectious diseases and therefore reduce the threat to the existential security of populations (Fincher et al. 2008) . Better protection from infectious diseases in turn weakens in-group closure and reduces the prevalence of patriarchal family relationships (Hudson et al. 2012; Welzel 2013) , which again fosters individualism and egalitarianism.
Geographic distance
There are multiple reasons to expect that countries located close to each other will share similar values. First, the level of interaction throughout history between neighboring countries is much more intense. Thus, values are more likely to have been borrowed from or imposed by neighboring countries. Shorter distances also make international migration much more likely and therefore values get transmitted with the migrating population. Countries that are close geographically are also very likely to share many elements of cultural heritage. It is hence possible that the clustering of countries within geographic regions is spurious. Conversely, neighbors are naturally more likely to engage in conflicts and therefore their antagonism may result in the negation of their rival's culture. That means that ceteris paribus two countries in close proximity could in fact have more different cultures than to those further apart.
Data and Methods

Statistical approach
In this paper I use the undirected dyadic ordinary least squared (OLS) model (Kenny, Kashy, and Cook 2006) which takes pairs of countries (dyads) as units of the analysis. The original data consisting of 40 cases were transformed into 780 unique combinations of countries that become the units of analysis and each variable indicates the difference (distance) or the relationship between the two countries in the dyad. The main advantage of this method over conventional cross-country analysis is that it allows for the inclusion of relational variables, which would not be possible when using single countries as units of analysis. For instance, geographic distance between pairs of countries could be added to the model, thus controlling for spatial dependence and quantifying the predictive power of distance on cultural similarities. Sharing the same official language or a language family are also relational variables that we can expect to be associated with cultural similarity as it eases communication between speakers and thus allows cultural diffusion. This hypothesis, however, could not be tested with the conventionally used regression models analyzing countries instead of dyads. Dyadic OLS allows also the use of a cumulative cultural distance between pairs of countries, which combines the distances on an unspecified number of value dimensions, as a single dependent variable. This considerably simplifies the analysis and avoids the unsettled debates on the dimensionality of cultural values.
Using dyadic analysis significantly enlarges the data set as each of the countries in the original data set is now part of multiple dyadic observations. For example, the country observation Germany contributes to dyad observations such as Albania-Germany, Bulgaria-Germany, Germany-Denmark and so on. This violates the basic assumption for independence of the observations because the standard errors between dyads including the same country would be correlated with each other, which would typically lead to underestimation of the standard errors, but not to biased estimates (Aronow, Samii, & Assenova, 2015) . A common approach to address the problem of interdependence in dyadic data is to compute two-way cluster-robust standard errors (Cameron, Gelbach, & Miller, 2011) . To do that I used the "vce(bootstrap, cluster (varlist))" option in Stata 14 with 1000 repetitions, where "varlist" includes both countries that comprise the dyad. This way I adjust the standard errors for clustering around both ID variables in the dataset -the first and the second country in the dyad -as they can appear multiple times at both sides.
Data and variables
The focus of this analysis is Europe at its largest boundaries, which includes all countries that are at least partly located in the continent or were part of the Soviet Union. The reason for including some Central Asian ex-Soviet republics is that they have been influenced by the same historical processes as many other Eastern European societies and are culturally and geopolitically oriented towards Europe. Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, for example, are part of the Eastern European partnership with the European Union, despite not being located geographically in the continent. The dataset therefore includes the maximum number of countries with valid data within the widely defined European region. Data were missing only for a few Western Balkan and mini states, leaving me with 40 countries, or 780 unique pairs of countries. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all variables used in the empirical analysis. The data source and operationalization of the variables are described below.
( Table 1 about Integrated Questionnaire and it includes aggregates of all value-related questions that are available in the dataset for all countries. The cultural distance between pairs of countries denotes the cumulative Euclidean distance on 98 items, related to a wide range of social values, believes, and attitudes. Even though some items might be less central to the ethos of society, taking each question from the dataset into consideration when computing the cultural distance has the advantage of avoiding the disputed issue over the classification (e.g., number of dimensions) of societal values (Maleki and de Jong 2014) . Instead of choosing arbitrarily, the inclusion of an item into the index is guided only by its availability for each country in the dataset. The question-specific distances are centered to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one, so that each item is given equal weight when calculating the cumulative cultural distance. Detailed descriptions of the index can be found in Spolaore and Wacziarg (2015) . As values are considered the most central element of culture (Hofstede 1991; Schwartz 2006) , questions related to values can be understood as measuring culture in a more general sense, thus the two terms 'value' and 'culture' are used interchangeably throughout this text.
Religion. I consider the historically predominant religion in each country as the most suitable measure of countries religious background, which has been consistently used in a number of analyses (e.g., Inglehart and Baker 2000; Fjellvang 2011 ). The variable denotes pairs of countries that share the same predominant religion as the reference category and separate categories for each combination of different religions.
Language similarity. A binary variable denotes whether a pair of countries shares the same language and another variable shows whether they belong to the same language family (data from Lewis, Simons, and Fennig 2014) , which is a proxy for language similarities.
Political-institutional traditions. I distinguish between countries that experienced communist rule in the previous century and those that did not. As I expect larger value differences between ex-communist and non-ex-communist countries, I denote this as the reference, but I distinguish dyads in which both parties are ex-communist from those that are not, as the two ideological traditions may have different integrating power. Additionally, I use the differences in the Index of Democracy 2006 from the Quality of Government Institute (Teorell et al. 2015) , which includes 60 indicators and thus more precisely measures the degree of actual democratization. I consider this as an important control variable in my final model but not as an element of the historical background of the countries.
Empire. A binary variable indicates whether a pair of countries was part of an empire or a unified state for a considerable time period in the last 500 years. These state formations include: the Russian, Turkish, Austro-Hungarian, and British Empires, the Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania, Denmark-Norway, and the United Kingdom of Sweden and Norway. The decision to denote pairs of countries as being part of an empire or state union was based on both the duration and the recency because events further back in history would have less pronounced impact on the contemporary culture of the countries. For that reason, the variable donates shared empire membership if the occurrence is with a duration of at least 50 years during the 20th century, more than 100 years if it is in the last two centuries and 150 years if it is in the last five centuries. This categorization is somewhat arbitrary, first because national borders in Europe were extremely fluid over the centuries and countries were rarely entirely independent or part of another state as of their contemporary borders, and second because state formations suppose different degrees of integration between its dominions. To address this problem to some extent, some countries, whose territory was split between different empires such as Romania, Ukraine, Belarus, and Armenia, were denoted as half members of the respective empires.
Socio-economic development. Three indicators for socio-economic development of the countries were employed. World Bank data on gross domestic product (GDP) per capita from 2005 was utilized as a measure of the level of economic development, which can be justified by its frequent use in previous studies (Inglehart and Baker 2000; Schwartz 2006 ). I compute the variable as the absolute difference in GDP per capita between the two countries. The differences in the share of the service sector of the economy, as suggested by Inglehart and Baker (2000) , is another indicator of societal development. The data were derived from the Quality of Government Institute (QoGI) (Teorell et al. 2015) . Life expectancy at birth, also from QoGI, is the third measure of socio-economic development, which is more directly linked to the key concept in modernization theory-the existential security of the individuals. Even though they are highly correlated, the three indicators add different nuances when measuring developmental differences, and there are no issues with multicollinearity. Climate. The Cool Water Index, obtained from Welzel (2013) , was chosen as a measure of the climatic conditions that are conducive to developing certain value characteristics. The index takes into account three elements of the physical environment: cool annual temperatures, continuous rainfall over all seasons, and the presence of permanently navigable waterways. The variable was calculated as the absolute differences between the countries' scores on this indicator.
Geographic distance. Data on the approximate longitude and latitude of the geographic centers of the countries were obtained from CIA World Factbook (2016) and the variable was calculated as the logged Euclidean distance between the pair of countries. The entry on Russia was edited to the coordinates of its capital, which better represents the economic, political and cultural center of the country.
The correlation matrix for all variables in my dataset presented in Table 2 demonstrates that many of the factors are moderately or even strongly correlated with each other, which means that their effects in multiple regression would partly overlap. This guides my analytical strategy to explore first the explanatory power of the factors in simple regression and then in multiple regression where their independent association can be identified.
( Table 2 about here) Table 3 presents the results of ten separate simple and multiple linear regressions. The first column consists of information about separate regression analyses on a number of single explanatory factors, unadjusted for confounders. They are presented in order to compare how their coefficients change when other explanatory variables are included in the model. The explanatory powers (R-squared) of the single and combined explanatory factors are also presented in Graph 1, again for comparison purpose. Religious differences between all groups are significant and substantial predictors of cultural distance, with the exception of OrthodoxMuslim pairs, which become significant only after adjustments in Model 2 and 4. The largest cultural gap is between Protestant and Muslim countries -everything else held equal (Model 4), they are still close to a whole standard deviation in the dependent variable apart from each other. Protestant countries are nearly as distinct from their Orthodox counterparts, and this gap also persists with model adjustments. Catholic countries seem much less distinguishable from any of the other religious clusters and in adjusted model they are not even significantly different from the Orthodox countries. While Orthodox and Muslim countries are the least distinct, the gap between them becomes more evident once we adjust for other variables in Model 2 and 4. Combined religion accounts for nearly one third of the value differences (Graph 1). The first model demonstrates that both sharing the same language and the same language family is associated with a significantly reduction in cultural distance between countries. The two variables explain a relatively small share of the total cultural distance between countries (13 per cent), but their coefficients are statistically significant in all models. The unadjusted Model 1 also shows that the Cold War division is the single most important factor explaining cultural differences in Europe: one third of the whole variation can be attributed to this simple distinction between ex-communist and non-ex-communist countries. The difference between the two coefficients indicates that communist countries are much more similar to each other than their Western counterparts. This is evident in the complete Model 4, where the coefficient of 'both ex-communist' remains significant but that of 'both non-ex-communist' changes sign and loses statistical significance. That means that Western countries are not more similar to each other than to the Eastern ones when all other factors are held equal. Both imperial legacies and years of common EU membership are significant predictors of value similarities both in the unadjusted and the adjusted models, but they have relatively small explanatory power (Graph 1). Climate is also a substantial predictor-nearly one fifth of the variation in cultural differences can be attributed to this single factor according to the unadjusted model-its coefficient is, however, no longer significant in the model with control variables. Not surprisingly, Model 1 shows that nations that are in geographical proximity also hold more similar values-this variable by itself explains nearly a quarter of the total variation in cultural distance. However, this association disappears when other factors are included in Model 4, implying that the geographical clustering is due to closely located countries having other characteristics in common.
Results
( Table 3 about here) As demonstrated in Model 2, all historical background factors combined explain 58 per cent of the variability in cultural distance. Model 3 shows that the three variables measuring differences in socioeconomic development have only slightly smaller explanatory power. An additional analysis using standardized coefficients (not presented here) demonstrates that, among the three variables, an increase in GDP per capita differences is associated with the largest cultural distance, followed by life expectancy, with a two times smaller effect size, and service sector differences as the weakest predictor. Due to an overlap with other factors, the effect size of these factors substantially falls in the final Model 4, but they all remain statistically significant. The final model demonstrates the comparative relevance of the factors that contribute to cultural clustering among European nations. Most coefficients decrease to about half of their original size, and combined, they explain two thirds of all cultural distance, which is much less than the total sum of the explanatory power from the simple regressions. Therefore, as expected, this confirms the substantial overlap between the predictors. Also, none of the factors seem to dominate substantially in terms of explanatory power.
(Graph 1 about here)
Discussion
This paper achieves the following goals: (1) it breaks down the concept of 'historical background,' which is thought to lead to the formation of distinguishable cultural zones, into its comprising elements, (2) it outlines a theoretical framework that explains how each of the factors is linked to value similarities, and (3) it compares the role of these factors in explaining cultural distance using dyadic OLS models. The analysis builds on previous studies that demonstrate the presence of distinguishable cultural clusters and the subsequent critiques of these classifications, which describe them as inconsistent and unsystematic. What I find is that no single factor can be held exclusively accountable for the formation of cultural zones. These findings imply the impossibility to draw clear dividing lines on the cultural map of Europe, because each underlying factor adds a different layer to the picture and they only partly overlap. The findings partially support Huntington's thesis, which underlines the importance of the cultural heritage. Even though religion is found to be among the most important factors determining cultural distance, a clear-cut division into Western, Orthodox, and Muslim civilizations cannot be supported. First, cultural gaps exist not only among these religiously defined zones but also between Protestant and Catholic countries, which Huntington groups together into Western civilization. Secondly, the most significant dividing line in Europe, according to this analysis, is not between countries with different religions, but along the former Iron Curtain. This does not imply that there are two civilizations instead, because the communist and democratic institutions cannot solely account for the differences. Eastern and Western Europeans differ with regard to their history, religious traditions, the languages they speak, their climates, and their level of socio-economic development, which all accumulate cultural distance. Countries on both sides of Europe also differ among themselves because they do not share the exact same historical background, their climate differs, and are not equally developed. At the same time, ex-communist countries that have linguistic and historical ties to Western Europe and have managed to catch up economically stand closer culturally to the West. In that sense, the cultural cluster model suggested by Inglehart and Baker (2000) , where countries are grouped based on their religion but there is also an overlapping ex-communist cluster, is closer to my findings; however, their approach is still reductive as it neglects many other overlapping factors that also play a significant role. The findings from this article, therefore, speak against the use of 'cultural zones' or 'civilizations' as analytical units. Nevertheless, there is solid evidence that historical background matters greatly, independent of the socio-economic factors. Hence, cultural heritage deserves considerable attention in cross-cultural research, but it should be analyzed as a multifaceted abstraction consisting of many elements which may or may not overlap in practice.
This article also adds to the debate between modernization theory and culturalist theory about the fundamental sources of value differences. The answer is that neither the degree of socioeconomic development nor the historical legacies of the countries have any supremacy in explaining cross-country cultural differences. This debate is very important considering contemporary processes of cultural development, particularly in the context of global economic shifts, globalization, and European integration. While it is believed that cultural values are relatively stable (Inglehart and Baker 2000) , a small change may lead to significant similarities or gaps over time. It is useful to distinguish between influential factors that are predetermined and more durable, such as language similarities and the predominant religion of the country, to those that presumably are more malleable, such as political institutions, economic development, participation in the European integration, and cross-country interactions. Only the latter factors have the potential to bring cultures closer together. A more dynamic approach, which considers the causal pathways leading to current cultural patterns, would let us better understand the roots of the differences. According to the theoretical outline, some of the factors considered in this analysis have a more fundamental position in the causal chain than others that pertain to recent history and supposedly partly mediate the effect of the underlying causes. Thus, it is important to clarify whether the historical heritage per se shapes the cultural values of nations or whether it comprises commonalities that make countries more likely to interact and exchange values with each other. The notion of cultural diffusion, which more probably takes place between countries that engage in closer co-operation, possibly leads to value convergence. Therefore, further studies should focus on testing the mechanisms through which cultural heritage contributes to defining value differences. Previous research demonstrates a diminishing importance of cultural heritage for inter-state trust and interactions (Klingemann and Weldon 2013) . The European Union also currently incorporates countries with various linguistic, religious, and historical traditions, thus opening the possibility to an intensive cultural exchange between its member states. If cultural clustering is primarily due to diffusion, then contemporary processes may contribute to the reduction of cultural gaps between countries. 
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